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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Today, we address a somewhat abstruse question of 
federal housing law: do the design and accessibility 
requirements of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(f)(3)(C), apply to a commercial building that was 
originally constructed before the requirements’ effective date, 
but converted into residential units after that date?  The 
District Court noted the near absence of precedent on this 
question, an absence our own research confirms.  Perhaps the 
lack of precedent on this question has something to do with 
the clear guidance offered by the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and, in one 
instance, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) on 
this issue, which answers the question in the negative. 
 
 To resolve this matter, the District Court relied on the 
familiar two-step analysis set out in Chevron, USA v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  In doing so, the 
District Court first found that Congress, speaking through § 
3604(f)(3)(C), left unanswered the precise question at issue 
here.  Second, owing to this ambiguity, the District Court 
concluded that HUD’s interpretation of the provision—which 
exempts converted buildings from the accessibility 
requirements1 if they were constructed prior to March 13, 
                                              
1 This provision states that these requirements apply “in 
connection with the design and construction of covered 
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1991—was entitled to deference.  Based on this 
determination, the District Court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim.  We will affirm that ruling.  
 
I. 
 Because this is an appeal from the granting of a motion 
to dismiss, we take the following factual background directly 
from the complaint and accept as true all facts set forth 
therein, drawing all reasonable inferences from such 
allegations in favor of the Appellant.  Mammaro v. New 
Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency,  814 F.3d 
164, 166 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing  James v. City of Wilkes–
Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012)).  Appellant Fair 
Housing Rights Center in Southeastern Pennsylvania 
(FHRC), a non-profit corporation, provides counseling, 
reference, advocacy, and dispute resolution services to 
individuals who may have suffered from discriminatory 
housing practices throughout southeastern Pennsylvania.  
This organization also receives grants and contracts HUD, 
under 42 U.S.C. § 3616, to investigate and monitor 
potentially discriminatory housing practices, and to enforce 
HUD policies.  One of the housing projects investigated by 
the FHRC was the Goldtex Apartment Building, located on 
North 12th Street in the city of Philadelphia.  That building 
was developed and owned by Appellees Post Goldtex GP, 
LLC and Post Goldtex, L.P. (collectively referred to as 
“Goldtex”).  Appellees KlingStubbins, LLP and 
                                                                                                     
multifamily dwellings for first occupancy after [March 13, 
1991].”  We refer to the standards established by § 
3604(f)(3)(C) as the “design and construction requirements” 
or, more simply, the “requirements.” 
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KlingStubbins, Inc., (collectively referred to as 
“KlingStubbins”), designed the apartment complex. 
 
 The building, constructed in 1912, was known 
originally as the Smaltz Building and was used first as a 
factory, and later for other manufacturing and business 
pursuits until the mid-1990s.  By the end of that decade, the 
Smaltz Building was abandoned and had fallen into disrepair.  
Goldtex purchased the Smaltz Building in 2010 and hired 
KlingStubbins to design a plan to convert the entire building 
into rental apartment units and retail space.  Pursuant to 
KlingStubbins’ design, the building—now known as the 
Goldtex Building—was almost gutted.  This included the 
removal of walls and windows, and the cladding of the 
exterior with new materials.  Other features, such as floors, 
remained intact.  The result was the conversion of a building 
originally used for manufacturing into a residential building 
with 163 apartment units and ground floor retail space.  The 
Goldtex Building began accepting tenants in 2013. 
 
 The FHRC conducted a site visit at the Goldtex 
Building in April of 2014 and reviewed the common areas of 
the facility as well as three different-sized rental units.  This 
investigation identified numerous violations of the FHA’s 
design and construction requirements.2  The FHRC sent these 
                                              
2 Among the noted violations were a main entrance door that 
was too heavy and the lack of an automatic door opener, entry 
doors on units that were less than 32 inches, units with 
thresholds into the entry hallway exceeding ¾ of an inch, 
units with interior doors less than 32 inches, units with 
passageways less than 36 inches, and units with kitchen 
counters too high for persons in wheelchairs.  
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findings, in detail, to Goldtex, along with a request that the 
violations be removed and/or repaired.  Goldtex responded, 
indicating their position that the Goldtex Building was 
exempt from the FHA requirements cited by the FHRC. 
 
 The FHRC filed suit against Goldtex and 
KlingStubbins in July of 2014, alleging violations of the FHA 
which, in turn, constituted housing discrimination against 
persons with disabilities.3  Goldtex and KlingStubbins filed 
motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted. 4  The 
FHRC timely appealed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 
3 Congress amended the FHA in 1988 to expand its 
protections from housing discrimination to persons with 
disabilities.  We recognized this expansion to be “a clear 
pronouncement of a national commitment to end the 
unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the 
American mainstream.”  Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 
89 F.3d 1096, 1105 (3d Cir. 1996).  Therefore, under the 
FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer 
or renter because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or 
intending to reside in the dwelling.”  42 U.S.C. § 
3604(f)(1)(B).   
 
4 Goldtex and KlingStubbins also filed motions for sanctions 
under Fed.  R. Civ. P. 11, which the District Court denied.  
The denial of those motions has not been appealed. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to 
dismiss under a plenary standard.  Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  That means we 
are “required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint 
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them 
after construing them in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant.”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 
153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the 
Supreme Court explained, however, that this tenet “is 
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  Questions of statutory 
interpretation are subject to de novo review.  Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
III. 
 In suing Goldtex and KlingStubbins, the FHRC’s 
complaint alleged that the Appellees discriminated against 
persons with disabilities by violating the design and 
construction requirements of the FHA, as set forth in that 
Act’s § 3604(f)(3)(C).  The FHRC also alleged housing 
discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and § 
3604(f)(2), and asked the District Court for a declaratory 
judgment that Goldtex and KlingStubbins’ actions and 
omissions violated the FHA, for a permanent injunction 
requiring Goldtex to bring the building into compliance, and 
for monetary damages, attorney fees and costs.    
 
 Goldtex and KlingStubbins filed motions to dismiss 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The Appellees argued 
8 
 
that the complaint should be dismissed because the plain 
language of § 3604(f)(3)(C), as well as HUD guidance on that 
provision, exempted the Goldtex Building from compliance.  
In its response in opposition to the motions to dismiss, the 
FHRC argued that HUD’s regulatory interpretations were  
invalid because, under Chevron, they are contrary to the 
unambiguous language of the statute.  The Appellees, in 
reply, argued that the FHRC could not raise a challenge to 
HUD’s interpretation of the provision unless through its 
complaint, and then could only do so via a claim under the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.  
KlingStubbins also raised a standing argument.5  The District 
Court did not address these arguments, but instead saw this 
case as governed by Chevron and proceeded directly to 
analyze the FHCA’s claim under that decision.   
                                              
5 On appeal, Appellant KlingStubbins argues that the FHRC 
lacks standing because the FHRC suffered no injury.  The 
FHRC has standing.  The Supreme Court specifically held 
that a fair  housing group, like the FHRC, has standing to sue 
if the discriminatory practices it is challenging have impaired 
its ability to carry out its mission.  Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1983); see also Alexander v. 
Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 427 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000).  The FHRC’s 
complaint alleges that the Appellees engaged in 
discriminatory housing practices, and that its mission to 
eradicate housing discrimination has been frustrated because 
it has had to divert resources in order to investigate and 
prosecute the alleged discriminatory practices in this case.  
These allegations are sufficient to establish standing.  And, as 
we have held, the allegation of discrimination is itself the 
harm.  Id. at 424. 
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 Like the District Court, we too will apply Chevron to 
resolve the merits of this appeal.  At Step One, we “question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court as well as the agency must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.  We move on to the second step 
only “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue.”  Id. at 843.  There, “the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute,” and the regulation must be given 
deference unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 843, 844. 
 
 Both parties tell us that we can decide this case at Step 
One because Congress answered the precise question at issue 
in the plain language of the provision.  The problem, 
however, is that they do not agree on what that answer was.  
The FHRC, for example, maintains that the plain language of 
the provision, as well as its general context, reveal Congress’ 
intention that the FHA’s accessibility requirements apply to 
any dwellings constructed and first occupied after the 
provision’s effective date—regardless of when the actual 
building was constructed.  For their part, the Appellees argue 
that the language of § 3604(f)(3)(C) unambiguously supports 
their contention that Congress did not intend to limit the term 
“occupancy” to residential occupancy.  They assert, for 
example, that because the language does not specifically limit 
the term “occupancy” to a residential context, Congress 
unambiguously intended the design and construction 
provision to apply to any building—residential, commercial, 
or otherwise. 
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 To determine whether a statute is unambiguous under 
Step One, “court[s] should always turn first to one cardinal 
canon before all others [:] we have stated time and again that 
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.”  Geisinger 
Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., 794 F.3d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Conn. Nat’l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).  Put more 
simply, “[w]here the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, further inquiry is not required.”  Rosenberg v. 
XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001).  Mindful 
then of this framework, we start with the text of § 
3604(f)(3)(C).   
 
 This particular provision states that the FHA’s 
accessibility requirements apply to “the design and 
construction of covered multi-family dwellings for first 
occupancy after the date that is 30 months after September 
13, 1988.”  42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C).  Like the District 
Court, we cannot divine Congress’ answer to the precise 
question at issue here by looking to the statute’s plain 
language.  That is, we cannot conclude that the statute, on its 
face, specifies that building conversions fall within the FHA’s 
reach.  On the one hand, “design and construction of . . . 
dwellings” seems to indicate that the focus of the statute is on 
the construction of the dwelling itself, not the building the 
dwelling is housed in.  An argument can be made, on the 
other hand, that we should read the phrase “construction of . . 
. dwellings for first occupancy” to mean that the statute only 
covers dwellings that are constructed for first occupancy as 
dwellings, that is, new construction, not conversions. 
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 The statute’s failure to define two important terms—
occupancy and construction—creates additional ambiguity.  
When words are left undefined, we often consult “standard 
reference works such as legal and general dictionaries in 
order to ascertain” their ordinary meaning.  United States v. 
Geisinger, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, those 
definitions are not helpful.  “Occupancy” is defined as the 
“taking possession of a property and the use of the same.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 973 (5th Ed. 1979).  No distinction is 
made in this definition between taking possession of 
residential or commercial property.  Therefore, we cannot tell 
whether Congress intended to limit the accessibility 
requirements to residential occupancy or commercial 
occupancy, or both.  The definition of the term “construction” 
is likewise unhelpful.  That term has been defined as “the 
creation of something new, as distinguished from the repair or 
improvement of something already existing.”  Id. at 283.  
This definition does nothing to answer the question whether 
the accessibility requirements apply to old, existing 
commercial buildings that were later converted for residential 
purposes.  Instead, it further muddies the waters.  That new 
creation could certainly be a brand new edifice, built from the 
ground up, but the same definition could also encompass an 
older commercial building that has been newly retrofitted for 
use as a residential apartment building.  Therefore, because 
this provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it 
cannot reveal the clear intention of Congress to require 
buildings constructed before March 13, 1991, but remodeled 
after that date, to comply with the accessibility requirements.  
Thus, we move on to the second step in the Chevron analysis 
to determine whether HUD’s interpretations of that provision 
are reasonable and permissible. 
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 Under Chevron, “if a statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  That 
is, “the agency’s interpretation must be given controlling 
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”  Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504, 512 (1994).  Put another way, given §3604(f)(3)(C)'s 
ambiguity on the question of its application to the Goldtex 
Building, we must now take into consideration HUD’s 
regulatory interpretations and the FHA’s implementing 
regulations.  These undermine the FHRC’s position in this 
case. 
 
 HUD is the federal agency primarily responsible for 
the implementation and administration of the FHA, and 
through various regulations and commentary, has supplied 
answers to the very question under review here.  See Meyer v. 
Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003).  The agency has defined 
“first occupancy” to mean “a building that has never before 
been used for any purpose.”  24 C.F.R. § 100.201.  This 
definition takes the Goldtex Building out of the ambit of § 
3604(f)(3)(C) because it was first occupied when it was built 
in 1912, and used for several purposes since then.  The 
building was not first occupied, in other words, when its 
residential tenants moved-in in 2013.  We agree with the 
District Court that since the language of the provision does 
not “unambiguously forbid” HUD’s interpretation, nor does it 
exceed “the bounds of the permissible,” it is reasonable and 
should be afforded deference.  See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212, 217-18 (2002). 
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 Further, in responding to concerns about a potential 
conflict between § 3604(f)(3)(C) and local historical codes, 
especially as those concerned the conversion of warehouse 
and commercial space to dwelling units, HUD unequivocally 
stated that: 
 
Comment.  Two commenters 
expressed concern about a 
possible conflict between the 
Act’s accessibility requirements 
and local historic preservation 
codes (including compatible 
design requirements).  The 
commenters stated that their 
particular concerns are: (1) The 
conversion of warehouse and 
commercial space to dwelling 
units; and (2) new housing 
construction on vacant lots in 
historically designated 
neighborhoods. 
 
Response.  Existing facilities that 
are converted to dwelling units 
are not subject to the Act’s 
accessibility requirements. 
Additionally, alteration, 
rehabilitation, or repair of 
covered multifamily dwellings are 
not subject to the Act’s 
accessibility requirements.  The 
Act’s accessibility requirements 
only apply to new construction.  
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With respect to new construction 
in neighborhoods subject to 
historic codes, the Department 
believes that the Act’s 
accessibility requirements should 
not conflict with, or preclude 
building designs compatible with 
historic preservation codes. 
 
Final Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, 56 FR 9472–01 
(emphasis added).  Also, a Joint Statement from the United 
States Department of Justice and HUD further supports our 
conclusion that the agency’s definition of the term 
“occupancy” takes the Goldtex Building out of the statute: 
 
16. Do the Fair Housing Act’s 
design and construction 
requirements apply to the 
alteration or renovation of 
nonresidential buildings into 
residential buildings? 
 
No. First occupancy means a 
“building that has never before 
been used for any purpose.”  The 
conversion of a nonresidential 
building into a residential 
building through alteration or 
renovation does not cause the 
building to become a covered 
multifamily dwelling. This is true 
even if the original nonresidential 
building was built after March 13, 
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1991. This situation needs to be 
distinguished, however, from 
additions of covered multifamily 
dwellings (see questions 12, 13 
and 14, above). See 24 C.F.R. § 
100.201; Questions and Answers, 
Q. 4, 8 and 9, 59 Fed.Reg. at 33, 
364–65. 
 
Example: A warehouse built in 
1994 is being rehabilitated into a 
small condominium residential 
building with two stories and a 
total of 12 dwelling units. This 
conversion of this building is not 
covered because at the time of its 
first occupancy it was not 
designed and constructed as a 
covered multifamily dwelling. 
 
Joint Statement on Accessibility (Design and Construction 
Requirements) for Covered Multifamily Dwellings under the 
Fair Housing Act (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.ada.gov./doj_hud_statement.pdf (emphasis 
added).  HUD, in both interpretive regulations and in other 
guidance, has been consistent in concluding that the 
accessibility requirements do not apply to buildings like the 
Goldtex Building because it was not newly constructed and 
was not first occupied after the effective date of the 
requirements.  These interpretations are reasonable and 
certainly reflect a legitimate policy choice by the agency in 
administering an ambiguous statute.  Therefore, like the 
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District Court, we defer to HUD’s reasonable interpretation of 
this provision.   
 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of 
the District Court dismissing the FHRC’s complaint. 
